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Design Protection-Time To Replace
the Design Patent
I. INTRODUCTION
Although designs are not creations which would be attrib-
uted to an act of invention, they have long received patent pro-
tection in the United States. In providing such protection both
Congress and the courts have analogized the standards for pro-
tecting designs to rules for granting mechanical patents. Since
this analogy is basically unsound, Congress has had difficulty
formulating legislation to provide suitable protection, and the
courts have found it difficult to apply these statutes. Although
the courts have recently tended to alter their interpretation of
the statutory standard of patentability for designs, resulting in a
standard analogous to that applied under the English regis-
tration system, an examination of present design patent law
clearly indicates the need for reformation.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF DESIGNS
A design is the characteristic or impression displayed by a
tangible object.1 It does not exist in isolation, as does a two-
dimensional picture, but must be affixed to some object.2 De-
sign is a completely subjective concept consisting only of its
effect upon the senses of the observer.3 Thus, for the purposes
of patent law, a design has been defined as:
[T]hat characteristic of a physical substance which, by means
of lines, images, configuration, and the like, taken as whole,
makes an impression, through the eye, upon the mind of the
observer. The essence of a design resides, not in the elements
individually, nor in their method of arrangement, but ... in
that indefinable whole that awakens some sensation in the ob-
server's mind.4
To qualify for design patent protection, the object expressing
the design must be an article of manufacture 5 which is capable
of being reproduced.6 By definition the term does not include
1. Mott, The Standard of Ornamentality in the United States De-
sign Patent Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 548, 548-49 (1962). See generally 2 WALKER,
PATENTS § 162 (2d ed. Deller 1964) [hereinafter cited as WALKER].
2. Mott, supra note 1.
3. Dienner, Protection of Industrial Designs, 45 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y
673, 676 (1963).
4. Pelouze Scale & Mg. Co. v. American Cutlery Co., 102 Fed. 916,
918 (7th Cir. 1900).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1964).
6. Harmon Paper Co. v. Kimberly Clark Co., 289 Fed. 501, 509
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natural products or elements,7 nor does it include a process.8
Design patents have been upheld on a wide range of articles of
manufacture, such as silverware,9 an electric light socket,10 a
toy duck," an embroidered textile fabric, 12 and an ornamental
awning fabric.'3 There is some question as to whether a pro-
tectable design can be hidden part of the time,14 but it is clear
that articles intended for an obscure use cannot obtain a design
patent.'5 The fact that any article of manufacture has movable
parts does not disqualify protection, 6 but a mere dimensional
change of an existing object is not patentable as a design.'7
Although a design may qualify for a mechanical patent or
a copyright, the qualifications for these types of design protec-
tions are distinguishable. While a mechanical invention must be
useful to qualify for patent protection, 8 utility plays no part in
(E.D. Wis. 1922). See In re Hadden, 20 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1927); Har-
mon Paper Co. v. Prager, 286 Fed. 267, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 1922), affd, 287
Fed. 841 (2d Cir. 1923).
7. Mott, supra note 1, at 549.
8. See Waldman v. Swanfeldt, 66 F.2d 294, 296 (9th Cir. 1933);
In re Shetterly, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1169, 48 F.2d 421 (1931).
9. See R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co. v. Elimore Silver Co., 91 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Conn. 1950).
10. See In re Muldoon, 19 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1082, 56 F.2d 894
(1932).
11. See Knickerbocker Plastic Co. v. Allied Molding Corp., 96 F.
Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
12. See Amrein Fruedenberg Co. v. Garfield, 6 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.
N.Y. 1934).
13. See Swanfeldt v. Waldman, 50 F.2d 445 (S.D. Cal. 1931), rev'd
on other grounds, 66 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1933).
14. Compare Franklin Knitting Mills v. Gropper Knitting Mills,
15 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 761 (1926), with
Phoenix Knitting Works v. Hygienic Fleeced Underwear Co., 194 Fed.
696 (3d Cir. 1912), and In re Cornwall, 43 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 824, 230
F.2d 457 (1956).
15. See Williams v. Syracuse & S. Ry. Co., 161 Fed. 571 (C.C.N.D.
N.Y. 1908) (insulating plug for electric line supports); Wagner Type-
writer Co. v. F. S. Webster Co., 144 Fed. 405 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906) (ribbon
spool used in a typewriter).
16. Ex parte Klemm & Schreiber, 1915 C.D. 9; see Chandler Ad-
justable Chair & Desk Co. v. Heywood Bros. & Wakefield Co., 91 Fed.
163 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898); In re Koehring, 17 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 774,
776, 37 F.2d 421, 424 (1930).
17. King Ventilating Co. v. St. James Ventilating Co., 26 F.2d
357 (8th Cir. 1928). See also In re Smith, 22 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1209,
77 F.2d 514 (1935) (simulation of natural forms not patentable as a de-
sign).
18. E.g., Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883); Stein v.
Expert Lamp Co., 188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829
(1951); Application of Bremner, 37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1032, 182 F.2d
216 (1950); see 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
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determining the validity of a design patent.19 However, a de-
sign is not unpatentable as a design although it has some me-
chanical or utilitarian function.20 Broadly speaking, copyrights
protect works of art, while design patents protect the configura-
tion of an article of manufacture.2' The most significant dis-
tinction between the two lies in the more stringent requirements
to qualify for a design patent.22 A design must possess novelty
to be patentable, 23 while the novelty of the art or the object
described is irrelevant in determining the validity of a copy-
right.24 A copyright protects only the treatment of a subject-
the expression of the author's idea-whereas a patent protects
the subject itself.25
19. E.g., Koch Mfg. Co. v. Blue Star Auto Stores, 103 F.2d 598, 599
(7th Cir. 1939); In re Bigelow, 39 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 827, 830, 194 F.2d
545, 548 (1952).
20. E.g., In re La Montagne, 19 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 880, 882, 55 F.2d
486, 488 (1932).
21. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 4,5 (1964), with 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1964).
Frequently the two will overlap. See generally Pogue, Borderland-
Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 33 (1953);
Note, 66 HARV. L. REv. 877 (1953); Note, 27 IwD. L.J. 130 (1951). Over-
lapping usually occurs when an article of manufacture is also a work of
art. See William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.,
95 F. Supp. 264 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Jones Bros. v. Underkoffler, 16 F.
Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936). It has been held that merely because a de-
sign is patentable copyright protection is not precluded. Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954). However, whether a design can be patented and
also have copyright protection still appears to be an open question,
although several cases indicate this has been done. See, e.g., Rosenthal
v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953); Wilson v. Haber Bros., 275 Fed. 346(2d Cir. 1921).
22. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d
99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
23. See note 39 infra and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879). In gen-
eral terms novelty means the design in question is not anticipated by the
prior art. Anticipation means a prior art disclosure (a previous patent
on a similar design) is nearly identical to the design in question.
Interchemical Corp. v. Sinclair & Carroll Co., 50 F. Supp. 881, 890
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 144 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1944),
rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 327 (1945). See generally 1 WALKRm
§ 57.
25. See F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d
162 (1st Cir. 1951), afi'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952); Ansehl v. Puritan Phar-
maceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932); Muller v. Tribourough
Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). However, the United
States Supreme Court, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), 68 HAv.
L. REv. 517 (1955), indicated that perhaps this latter distinction is rather
nebulous by holding that a statuette intended for commercial use as a
lamp base was entitled to copyright protection. The statuette design
may also have been patentable, but the Court did not face this issue.
See 347 U.S. at 217.
[Vol. 51:942
DESIGN PROTECTION
III. DEVELOPMENT OF DESIGN PATENT LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES
A. EARLY HISTORY
Immediately after ratification of the Constitution, which
empowers Congress to promote the useful arts by authorizing
grants of limited monopoly,26 copyright and patent laws were
enacted. Writings and drawings were protected by copyright
law, while articles of manufacture and processes were protected
by patents.2 7 However, articles of manufacture with an orna-
mental or pleasing appearance could not be provided protection
solely on the basis of their appearance, since the nature of such
designs fell between the protection provided by the patent and
copyright laws. It was not until 1842 that the first laws were
enacted specifically to provide protection for designs.28 Finding
designs more analogous to patents than copyrights, Congress
framed the law in terms of patentability.29 No significant
change was made until the Consolidated Patent Act of 187030
which repealed and replaced previous law. Although the 1870
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The underlying theory is that economic
protection of creative contributions is necessary to encourage further
contributions. The resulting activity benefits the economic and cul-
tural welfare of the public. Lemlein, Patents-Their Origin, Nature
& Subject Matter, 2 BosToN B.J. 21, 22 (May 1958); see ROBINSON, PAT-
ENTS 16-23 (1890). But see Lewis, Monopoly and the Law, 6 MOD.
L. REv. 97 (1943). Lewis believes the patent grant is inconsistent with
the public interest because the user as well as the inventor is entitled
to the monopoly. Thus a firm could buy up all the monopolies to the
detriment of the public interest. Id. at 105. See also Pfaff, Patents and
Progress, 29 S.B. CALIF. J. 36, 37 (1954); Prager, Historic Background
and Foundation of American Patent Law, 5 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 309
(1961).
27. Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent
Protection in the United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 380 (1948).
The original copyright act gave protection to books, maps, and charts.
See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The initial patent act
afforded protection to new and useful arts, engines, machines, and
manufactures, and improvements thereon. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7,
1 Stat. 109.
28. Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543. Ornamental designs
are a useful art within the meaning of the Constitution because of their
pleasing appearance, Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524
(1871), and because they make articles of manufacture more attractive
and thus more saleable. See Mott, supra note 1, at 548; 22 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 624, 625 (1954).
29. Hudson, supra note 27, at 382-83. It has also been suggested
that Congress resorted to patent protection rather than copyright pro-
tection because, at the time, there was no central copyright depository.
Id. at 383.
30. Ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
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act was otherwise similar to its predecessors, its wording made it
appear that a design had to be "useful" to be protected. 31 Since
this change raised problems of interpretation which could not be
resolved in a uniform manner,32 the 1870 act was amended in
1902.33 This act substituted the word "ornamental" for "useful",
and the term "article of manufacture" was substituted for the
specific classes of articles previously enumerated.34
B. STATE OF THE LAW UNDER THE PREsENT STATUTE
1. Prior to the Laverne Case
In 1952 an entire new set of patent laws was enacted, includ-
ing the present Design Patent Act which provides:
Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, sub-ject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The pro-
visions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply
to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided.35
Originally there was some question as to whether the 1952 act
was a codification of existing law, or whether it established a
new standard. Although only a minority of contested design
patents were upheld prior to the 1952 act36 the act's legislative
history 37 and several court opinions38 indicate that the strict
standard of patentability for designs remained unchanged.
Thus, there appear to be four requirements for a design patent
31. See Consolidated Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 209.
32. One case held that the term meant "adaption to producing
pleasant emotions." Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 C.D. 251. Another inter-
preted "useful" to mean "giving certain new and original appearances
to a manufactured article [tending to] enhance its salable value . .. ."
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871). Several cases
held that utility may constitute the basis for granting a design patent.
See Hudson, supra note 27, at 386.
33. The 1902 act provided: "Any person who has invented any new,
original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture . .. may
... obtain a patent therefor."
Design Patent Act of 1902, ch. 783, § 4929, 32 Stat. 193.
34. See ibid. Congress' intent was to alleviate the problems en-
countered under the previous acts by providing a broad, general stand-
ard to be interpreted by the courts. See Hudson, supra note 27, at
389-92.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1964).
36. See Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 A.S.C.A.P. COPYRIGHT L. SYM.
79, 82 n.10 (1967); Walter, A Ten Year Survey of Design Patent Litiga-
tion, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 389, 389-90 (1953).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1952). But see
98 CONG. REc. 9323 (1952) (remarks of Senator McCarran) (bill makes
some changes in the law of patents).
38. E.g., Hawley Prods. Co. v. United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d
69, 72 (1st Cir. 1958).
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under the 1952 act: invention, novelty, originality, and orna-
mentality.3 9
Prior to 1952 it was generally held that the standard of in-
vention for design was the same as for a mechanical patent:40
"was the new combination within the range of the ordinary rou-
tine designer?"41 The standard was not met when a product
only represented the skill of an ordinary designer chargeable
with knowledge of the prior art.42 In other words, if the design
was one which was obvious to a designer skilled in the art, it
was not patentable.43
A new section governing the standard of invention was in-
corporated into the 1952 act:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains .... 44
In R. M. Palmer Co. v. Ludens,45 this section was held applicable
as the standard of invention for design patents. Although the
courts initially disagreed as to whether the standard of invention
was more strict or more liberal under this section,46 the Supreme
Court finally resolved the question by holding that this provision
neither raised nor lowered the standard of invention.47 Thus it
39. E.g., In re Faustmann, 33 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1065, 1070, 155
F.2d 388, 392 (1946); cf. General Time Instruments Corp. v. United
States Time Corp., 165 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846
(1948); In re Park, 37 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1021, 1023, 181 F.2d 255, 256
(1950); see Pogue, supra note 21, at 39; 40 TEXAs L. REV. 1065, 1066
(1962). See also In re Mains, 22 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1299, 77 F.2d 533
(1935); In re Hall, 21 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 937, 69 F.2d 660 (1934).
40. See, e.g., Strause Gas Iron Co. v. William M. Crane Co., 235
Fed. 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1916); Steffens v. Steiner, 232 Fed. 862, 864 (2d
Cir. 1916). But see Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679
(1893) (standard of invention for design patents distinguishable from me-
chanical patents); Franklin Lamp Mfg. Co. v. Albe Lamp & Shade Co.,
26 F. Supp. 960, 961 (E.D. Pa. 1939) (mere ornamentation sufficient).
41. Strause Gas Iron Co. v. William MV. Crane Co., supra note 40,
at 131.
42. S. Dresner & Son v. Doppelt, 120 F.2d 50, 52 (7th Cir. 1941);
Mary Muffet, Inc. v. Loma Dress Co., 39 F. Supp. 415, 417 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
43. See, e.g., Cavu Clothes v. Squires, Inc., 184 F.2d 30, 33 (6th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 920 (1951).
44. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964).
45. 236 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1956), 45 CALF. L. REV. 385 (1957).
46. SM=rH, PATENT LAw 482-83 (1964), and cases cited therein;
Chin, The Statutory Standard of Invention: Section 103 of the 1952
Patent Act, 3 PAT. T.M. & CoPRvIGHT J. 317, 320-23 (1959); see Note,
63 COLUm. L. REV. 306, 313-23 (1963).
47. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1965), 34 GEo.
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seems established that a design must still be "nonobvious to a
person of ordinary skill in the art" to be patentable under the
1952 act.48
As was the case under previous acts, the test of novelty
under the 1952 act is determined with reference to the sight im-
pression of an ordinary observer.4 1 The design in question is
compared with previous articles of design, and if both designs
appear to the ordinary observer to be essentially the same, the
design is not novel.50 Therefore, minute differences which would
appear to an expert, but which would escape notice by an
average observer, are not taken into consideration; 51 the average
observer must feel the design is not merely a modification of the
prior art.52 In defining the scope of the prior art, the courts
have universally held that any type of patent upon an article
can constitute anticipation of a design patent.53
Although a design must meet the additional requirements
of originality 54 and ornamentaliy, 55 these requirements are
WAsH. L. REv. 802 (1966); see Comment, 34 U. K.xN. Crry L. REV. 393,
407 (1966).
48. E.g., Sel-O-Rak Corp. v. Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp.,
232 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956); Falcon
Indus., Inc. v. R. S. Herbert Co., 128 F. Supp. 204, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1955);
In re Levy, 50 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 803, 805, 310 F.2d 751, 752 (1962);
In re Peet, 41 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 826, 828, 211 F.2d 602, 603 (1954); see
Note, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1520, 1521 (1959). See generally 2 WALKER § 164.
49. E.g., Goudy v. Hansen, 247 Fed. 782, 785 (1st Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 246 U.S. 667 (1918).
50. E.g., Thabet Mfg. Co. v. Kool Vent Metal Awning Corp., 226
F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1955); Granklin Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Gropper
Knitting Mills, Inc., 7 F.2d 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), cert. denied, 273 U.S.
761 (1926); In re Abrams, 40 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1045, 1047, 205 F.2d 202,
203 (1953); see, e.g., E.H. Sheldon & Co. v. Miller Office Supply Co.,
188 F. Supp. 67, 70 (S.D. Ohio 1960).
51. Matthews & Willard Mfg. Co. v. American Lamp & Brass Co.,
103 Fed. 634, 637 (C.C.D.N.J. 1900).
52. E.g., Thabet Mfg. Co. v. Kool Vent Metal Awning Corp., 226
F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir. 1955). A modification means the prior art ma-
terial exhibits a substantial representation of the patented improvement.
Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516 (1870). A mere modifica-
tion also exists if the result flows naturally from the prior art. E.g., In
re Tanczyn, 44 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 764, 241 F.2d 731 (1957).
53. E.g., In re Rutledge, 18 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1081, 1083, 47 F.2d
797, 798 (1931). See generally 2 WALKER § 167. Thus, a mechanical
patent may anticipate a design patent. E.g., Waring Prods. Corp. v.
Landers, Frary & Clark, 263 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Hoffman,
21 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 924, 926, 68 F.2d 978, 979 (1934); In re Hargraves,
19 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 784, 785, 53 F.2d 900, 901 (1931); see, e.g., In re
Lamb, 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1040, 1045, 327 F.2d 679, 682 (1964). See
also In re Eppinger, 25 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 843, 94 F.2d 401 (1938).
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1964).
55. See, e.g., In re Bartlett, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 969, 300 F.2d 942
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rarely considered by the courts. Their main concern invariably
centers on invention and novelty.56
Both the courts and the Patent Office frequently have had
difficulty distinguishing the standard of invention from that
of novelty. In In re Johnson,57 the United States Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals stated:
Courts in considering design patents almost universally apply
the rule that it is not enough if a particular design be new,
original, and ornamental, but there must be present the exercise
of the inventive faculty as well. The courts seem to be of one
accord in stating that the fourth element of the formula which
tests the patentability of a design, viz., the exercise of the in-
ventive faculty, defies definition and resides as a subjective
standard in the mind of the judge considered as an "average
observer."58
Thus Johnson seemed to require that a design not be obvious to
an average observer to be inventive, but omitted any reference
to a person having ordinary skill in the art. The case also held
that the test of novelty was whether the average observer would
acknowledge the new design as different from the prior art.59
Hence, Johnson implied the tests for the standard of invention
and novelty are nearly identical. 0
More than ten years later, in In re Bartlett,61 the same court
commented that Johnson only enunciated the test for novelty
and not the test of invention.6 2  However, the Bartlett court
conceded that "whether the design is unobvious is a question not
unrelated to novelty ... and the differences in degree and in
kind which one can observe are the only criteria of decision avail-
able to us.16 3 This statement indicates that although the Johnson
test of patentability was apparently incorrect, the reasoning of
(1962). But see Mott, The Standard of Ornamentality in the United
States Design Patent Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 548 (1962).
56. See, e.g., In re Bartlett, 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 969, 300 F.2d 942
(1962). But see Mott, supra note 55.
57. 36 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1175, 175 F.2d 791 (1949).
58. Id. at 1177, 175 F.2d at 792. Although the holding of Johnson
appears contra to authority, the case has been dismissed as merely being
a poorly written opinion. See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
59. 36 C.C.P.A. (Patents) at 1177, 175 F.2d at 792.
60. See ibid. Both tests use the ability of the average observer to
distinguish as the measure. In the first the design must be unobvious,
and in the second it must be different from the prior art. It is arguable
that "unobvious" and "different from the prior art" are two analogous
terms describing the same concept. A trivial difference is not sufficient
to establish novelty. The requisite greater degree of difference is prob-
ably reached when the design in question is unobvious from the prior art.
61. 49 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 969, 300 F.2d 942 (1962).
62. Id. at 971, 300 F.2d at 943.
63. Id. at 972, 300 F.2d at 944.
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the Johnson court was not entirely invalid. Finally, in In re
Boldt,64 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals recognized that
the test for standard of invention was whether it would be "ob-
vious to one of ordinary skill in the art .... ,5
2. The Laverne Standard
In Application of Laverne,66 the same court held that the
standard of patentability for a design was that the design cannot
have been obvious to the ordinary intelligent man.67 The La-
verne court wrestled with the problem of using the test of a per-
son skilled in the art, but it decided this test was not suited to
the design area.68 The court said that although the 1952 act did
not clearly define the standard of patentability, it abolished the
necessity of defining a standard of invention and substituted the
unobviousness test.69 The opinion then stated:
We feel that the test of patentability of an admittedly new de-
sign cannot be whether it is no more than a "competent de-
signer" might produce. That would be parallel to saying of a
mechanical invention that it is no more than a "competent in-
ventor" might produce. The test must be obviousness, for that
is the dictate of section 103, but it must be applied in a way
which will implement the legislative intent to promote progress
in the field of industrial design by means of patent incentive.
This will not be done by denying patents to everything compe-
tent designers produce by the skill of their calling.7 0
Laverne also shed new light upon the question of what con-
stitutes the prior art. Contrary to the weight of authority, La-
verne indicated that the art involved was limited to the field of
design.71 It would seem to follow from this reasoning that a
64. 52 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1283, 344 F.2d 990 (1965).
65. Id. at 1285, 344 F.2d at 991. However, the dissent seemed to
be in a quandary as to whether the standard of invention was really
isolated from the test of novelty. Id. at 1285, 344 F.2d at 991-92. The
dissent was written by Judge Rich who later wrote the majority opinion
in the landmark case of Application of Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A.
1966). See notes 66, 67 infra and accompanying text.
66. 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
67. Id. at 1006.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. The application the Laverne court held to be erroneously re-
jected by the patent office was for a chair design. The court felt that
"since those who create designs are designers, not chair makers, it
would seem to follow that he is operating in the field of industrial design
and that it is the 'art' involved." Id. at 1005-06. It seems arguable that
the design was obvious from the prior art. See id. at 1004. For a chair
design held unpatentable in view of the prior art compare Howell Co.
v. Royal Metal Mg. Co., 93 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1937).
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mechanical patent could no longer anticipate a design patent.
Thus Laverne appears to have inaugurated some new standards
for design patents concerning both the standard of patentability
and what constitutes the prior art.
C. EVALUATION OF THE PUPORTED NEW STANDARD
The Laverne rule implies that the test for the standard of
invention is identical to the test for novelty. Thus if a design is
novel with respect to the prior art, it is patentable.7 2 By em-
ploying such a test, the court disregarded all of the generally
accepted precedents.73 However, as the history of the law of
design patents indicates, the courts have always had difficulty
formulating standards of patentability for designs.
The basis of the courts' difficulty is Congress' subconscious
attempt to equate design patents with mechanical patents. For
example, one of the requirements for granting a mechanical
patent is that the invention have "utflity. ' 74 However, there is
no reason for requiring the design of such an article to have
utility in order to be patentable.7 5 Another unfortunate choice
is Congress' use of the word "invent" throughout all of the
design patent acts to describe the process of creating a design.
The long established standard of patentability for designs prob-
ably arose from use of these inapplicable terms.76
It has been advocated that novelty should be the standard
of invention for all patents in lieu of that expressed in section
103 of the 1952 act.77 As it relates to design patents, such a
standard seems justifiable. A design is not something which
72. It is assumed for the purpose of this discussion that the design
is also original and ornamental-the other prerequisites for granting a
design patent. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
75. Callmann, Style and Design Piracy, 22 J. PAT. OFr. Soc'y 557,
569 (1940).
76. See 356 F.2d at 1005 n.l. Even the commentators cannot agree
on the meaning of the word "invention." One writer says there are
two distinct meanings to the word-a new creation or merely a first
introduction. INLOw, THE PATENT GRANT 133 (1950). Another believes
that invention and discovery are synonymous terms. Henry, Standards
of Invention in Mechanical Cases, 32 J. PAT. OFr. Soc'y 97, 100 (1950).
77. Deller, An Inquiry into the Uncertainties of Patentable Inven-
tion and Suggested Remedies, 38 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 152, 176 (1956);
Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent
Act of 1952, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 658, 672-73 (1955); see 1 ROBERTS,
PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONs AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PATENTS 170-
71, 248 (1927). See also CuRTs, PATENTS 25 (4th ed. 1873).
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comes out of a laboratory to fulfill a need, nor is it an ingenious
gadget valuable to the user because of its functional aspects.
For this reason it is meaningless to say that a design is invented.
A design is instead a creation which is only valuable in the eye
of the person beholding it-the average observer-and its value
lies in its aesthetically pleasing qualities. While there are many
elements a competent designer considers in creating a design, 78
these are not in themselves crucial to the beholder, since he may
believe an artistically poor design to be extremely beautiful. 0
There is no overriding reason why such a design should be
denied protection merely because it is obvious to one skilled in
the art. 0 As long as a design is novel-appears materially dif-
ferent to the average observer-it should be given patent pro-
tection.81
If the test for the standard of patentability of being non-
obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art is maintained,
the demise of all design patents could eventually result.82 Pres-
ently, ordinary skill is a statistical concept designating a mini-
mum level, and ingenuity is the intangible skill above the mini-
mum level a designer must employ to receive a patent.8 3 How-
ever, this is a cyclical process8 4 in which the ingenuity or crea-
78. Some of the elements a modern designer may consider in his
creation include: fitness to function, materials, and techniques; unity
and simplicity; rhythm of proportion and of line and form; dominance,
accent, and scale; balance and symmetry; and style and individuality.
Bowen, Design Patents and Modern Industrial Designs, 37 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 744, 748-50 (1955). An industrial designer may also consider the
additional factors of economical manufacture, sales appeal, and advice
from production and sales departments. Id. at 752.
79. The artistic value of a work of art is immaterial in providing
it copyright protection. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp.
729, 730 (M.D. Pa. 1936); Pellegrini v. Allegrini, 2 F.2d 610, 611 (E.D.
Pa. 1924). See also Note, 68 HAIv. L. REV. 517, 526 (1955).
80. Even though the courts have not examined the concept of orna-
mentality in much detail, at least one writer feels a design should be
patentable only if its over all aesthetic effect is pleasing and attractive.
Mott, supra note 55, at 551. However, this is an extremely difficult
test to apply, as in most cases any reference to an advance in aesthetic
value is meaningless. Note, 72 HAv. L. REv. 1520, 1523 (1959). But
see Belding Heminway Co. v. Future Fashions, Inc., 143 F.2d 216, 217
(2d Cir. 1944).
81. Again it must be remembered that this is the result only if the
design is also original and ornamental. See note 39 supra. But see
Bowen, supra note 78, at 751. Bowen believes that all the considera-
tions a competent designer takes into account when creating a design
should be relevant as to whether a design is patentable.
82. See Application of Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
83. See Frankl, On Judgments of Patentability, 37 J. PAT. OrF.
Soc'y 125, 131 (1955).
84. Id. at 138.
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tivity of a few individuals of past years becomes the present
level of ordinary skill in the community. 5 Thus, the past
extraordinary creations of a few become the present ordinary
level of skill for all in the group. 6 Although there may be some
basis for this cycle in the area of mechanical patents, there is
no reason to keep increasing the level of sophistication necessary
for the grant of a design patent.87
The slight modification of an existing design may constitute
a new design which should be provided protection.88 In this re-
spect "modern design is not static but instead is moving in a
direction toward improvement .... [D] esign ... is only alive
when it is in a state of flux .... ,89 By making design protection
easier to obtain, a design is kept in a state of flux, thereby
advancing the cultural welfare of the country.9 0 Implementing
novelty as the test for design protection is a feasible method of
achieving this goal.91
If novelty is established as the standard of patentability for
designs, the language in Laverne concerning the prior art must
also be adopted.9 2 An inventor or designer is stimulated by a
number of concurring situations in making his discovery or
creation.93 In the case of an invention it is necessary to examine
prior patents in all arts to be sure that the item for which pro-
tection is sought would not have been an obvious result of the
efforts of the skilled mechanics. In the case of a design, however,
what stimulates the designer is totally irrelevant under the La-
verne novelty test. All that must be known is whether the
design is novel. To be novel, a design must be different from
previous designs, as seen by an average observer.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id. at 137.
87. A mechanical patent is granted for invention of a useful article.
However, since our society's technological advancement is and has been
so rapid, to be protected, an invention should involve something more
than the existing technological state. If it did not, every discovery
would be patentable. However, this argument does not seem to apply
to designs. See ibid.
88. Callmann, supra note 75, at 557-58.
89. Bowen, supra note 78, at 751.
90. Pfaff, Patents and Progress, 29 S.B. CALIF. J. 36, 37 (1954). It
is arguable that by lowering the standard there will be more oppor-
tunity for competing goods to enter the market. As a consequence,
competition will be advanced, and the grant of a monopoly will be
limited to a closer function of the design's contribution to society.
91. But see Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1535 (1959).
92. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Frankl, On Judgments of Patentability, 39 J. PAT. OFr.
Soc'y 122, 132 (1957).
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Merely because an article covered by a patent other than a
design patent is aesthetically pleasing does not constitute grounds
to include it in the prior art, even though it may appear to be a
stimulus for the design in question. If the previous design is
novel, and the creator wishes to protect it, he should apply for
design protection. If he does not protect his design, there seems
to be no reason to deny protection to a subsequent design by
anticipation. In all areas of patent law it is recognized that
novelty is not negatived by any previous patentable invention, if
the patentability of that invention was not recognized until
later than the date of the invention sought to be anticipated
thereby.9 4 Once a patent has been obtained, however, a sub-
sequent designer seeking protection in that particular art will
have to originate a novel design as compared to the first one.
In this way the art of design is stimulated, and those designers
desiring protection may receive it.
D. MPICATIONS OF THE Laverne STANDARD
1. Design Is Not a Patent Concept
By implication Laverne points out the misconception which
has bothered Congress and the courts from the start-designs
simply are not concepts which can be analogized to mechanical
patents.9 5 Although the Laverne court stated that its holding
was dictated by section 103 of the 1952 act,96 that section must
be read very broadly to arrive at this interpretation. It is the
duty of Congress, not the courts, to designate the type of pro-
tection to be provided designs and the standards governing that
protection.9 7
94. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711 (1880); Inter-
national Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). Of course it must be remembered that this doctrine is limited
by 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1964). Thus if a design is in the general public
domain, patentability is precluded. See generally 1 WALxER § 67 at 318.
95. See Dienner, Protection of Industrial Designs, 45 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 673, 673-74 (1963); 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 624, 626 (1954).
96. 356 F.2d at 1006.
97. Deller, supra note 77, at 177. The Constitution gives Congress
broad powers to promote the cultural welfare by providing protection
for the "arts." McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843);
Lutz, Can Ornamental Designs for Useful Articles Be Protected by Copy-
right?, 2 PAT. T.M. & COPYMGLT J. 289, 297 (1958); Note, 31 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1263, 1292-93 (1956); see Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and
Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 116-17 (1929);
Lutz, Are the Courts Carrying Out Constitutional Public Policy on
Patents?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 766, 773-74, 791 (1952); cf. Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). But see
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220 (1954) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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In its effort to provide adequate design protection, it is un-
fortunate that Congress did not consider an entirely separate
category of protection.98 Such an approach undoubtedly would
have alleviated many of the problems encountered over the
last century. 9 With the state of the law as it is, it is probable
that in the near future Congress will be faced with a proposal for
deleting the present patent protection for designs and adopting
a new type of protection. °00
2. The English System of Protecting Designs
The British recognize that design is neither a patent nor a
copyright concept by providing a separate registration system for
designs. Employing standards similar to those stated in Laverne,
they have solved many of the problems still being faced by
American courts.
The act currently governing designs provides:
(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section, a de-
sign may, upon application made by the person claiming to be
the proprietor, be registered under this Act in respect of any
article or set of articles specified in the application.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a design shall not be
registered thereunder unless it is new or original and in par-
ticular shall not be so registered in respect of any article if it is
the same as a design which before the date of the application
for registration has been registered or published in the United
Kingdom in respect of the same or any other article or differs
from such a design only in immaterial details or in features
which are variants commonly used in the trade.101
98. The wording of the Constitution does not specify a patent and
copyright dichotomy as the exclusive types of protection. The Constitu-
tion merely specifies that protection may be granted to the items therein.
See Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 517, 522 (1955).
99. One writer believes the present insecurity is due to short-
sightedness of the 1902 act. Callmann, supra note 75, at 557. The 1952
act did not alleviate these problems, since the act was essentially a crys-
talization of present law. See Moellenberg, The Question of Choice Be-
tween Copyrighting or Patenting a Design, 13 A.S.C.A.P. COPYRIGHT L.
Smy. 165, 169 (1964).
100. The REPORT Or THE PRESIDENT'S Co vUssION ON THE PATENT
SYsTEm 12 (1966) has recommended repeal of the present Design Pat-
ent Act and adoption of another form of protection for designs. How-
ever, the REPORT was silent as to recommendations for providing an
alternative form of protection. Initial legislative attempts at reform
have left the present Design Patent Act virtually untouched. See S.
1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 171, 172, 173 (1967); H. R. 5924, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 171, 172, 173 (1967).
101. The Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 88,§ 1. The act is very comprehensive compared to the Design Patent Act
in the United States. Compare The Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13
& 14 Geo. 6, c. 88, with The Design Patent Act § 171 (1952), 35 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1964).
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For a design to be qualified for registration: it must be a "de-
sign" as contemplated by the statute; the person seeking registra-
tion must be the proprietor of the design; it cannot have been
previously published in the United Kingdom; and it must be
"new or original.' 0 2
A design is generally defined to be a conceptual creation.
A vivid illustration of this appears in Dover, Ltd. v. Niirnberger
Celluloidwaren Fabrik Gebrilder Wolff: ' 03
[D] esign means something which is applicable to an article by
printing, painting . . . or any other means whatever, manual,
mechanical, or chemical. Design means, therefore, a conception
or suggestion or idea of a shape or of a picture or of a device,
or of some arrangement which can be applied to an article by
some manual, mechanical, or chemical means. It is a conception,
suggestion or idea .... 104
As in the United States, a design must be registered in respect to
an article of manufacture, and the article must perform some
function other than carrying the design.10 5 Moreover, the
requirements of nonpublication in the United Kingdom and that
the proprietor must be the one applying for registration are simi-
lar to the American requirements.
The marked difference between the Registered Designs Act
and the American Design Patent Act is the statutory provision
establishing the standard for granting the limited monopoly.
The criterion under the English act, that a design must be "new
or original"'0 6 on its face, appears to provide alternative stand-
ards.
Clearly if the design is novel or new it can be registered. 0 T
102. See The Registered Designs Act, 1949, supra note 101 and ac-
companying text.
103. [1910] 2 Ch. 25 (C.A.).
104. Id. at 28.
105. Application of Littlewoods Pools, Ltd., 66 R. Pat. Cas. 309, 310-
11 (Pat. App. Trib. 1949); see Tyler & Sons v. Sharpe Bros. & Co., 11 R.
Pat. Cas. 35, 36 (Ch. D. 1893). See also Bayer v. Symington, 25 R. Pat.
Cas. 56 (H.L. 1907).
106. See The Registered Designs Act, supra note 101 and accom-
panying text.
107. Where it is conceded the design is not "original" under the act,
novelty must be stated. Thomas M. Nutbrown, Ltd. v. Taylor Law &
Co., [1957] R. Pat. Cas. 36, 40 (Ch. D. 156). A design which is obvious
or a fraudulent imitation of another design is not new. Morphy-Rich-
ards, Ltd. v. Tym's Elec., Ltd., 64 R. Pat. Cas. 155, 162 (Ch. D. 1947);
Wallpaper Mfgs., Ltd. v. Derby Paper Staining Co., 42 R. Pat. Cas. 443,
449 (Ch. D. 1925); accord, Phillips v. Harbro Rubber Co., 37 R. Pat.
Cas. 233, 242 (H.L. 1920); see also Schmittzehe v. Roberts, 72 R. Pat.
Cas. 122 (Ch. D. 1955); Manchester v. S. Umfreville & Son, 24 R. Pat.
Cas. 782, 789 (Ch. D. 1907).
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Novelty is judged through the eye of the observer, 0 8 who is
normally the judge. 1 9 He is considered an average observer
as opposed to one skilled in design art."0 If there is a marked
difference between the design in question and the prior art, the
design is novel."' By a marked difference it is generally meant
that the novelty must be substantial," 2 but a high standard of
ingenuity is not required. 1 3 The problem of what constitutes
the prior art is somewhat removed from the corresponding prob-
lem in the United States. Since only designs are registered,
there is no concept of a mechanical patent anticipating a design,
and the prior art is therefore confined to registered designs."
4
However, it is not limited to the class of articles on which the
design sought to be registered is carried." 5
Even if a design is not new, it apparently may be provided
protection under the alternative of "originality." It has been
suggested that this interpretation follows from applying the
novelty test not to the idea itself, but to its use on a new sub-
ject matter." 6  If by an exercise of intellectual activity an
old design is applied to a new article, the design is novel because
it is originally applied. This, however, seems to be a rather
strained interpretation. Having established that the test of nov-
elty is applied with respect to all registered designs regardless of
108. Kestos, Ltd. v. Kempat, Ltd., 53 R. Pat. Cas. 139, 153 (Ch. D.
1935); Gillard v. Worrall, 22 R. Pat. Cas. 76, 80 (Ch. D. 1904); Smith
v. Hope Bros., 6 R. Pat. Cas. 200, 206 (Ch. D. 1889); see also Bayer v.
Symington, 25 R. Pat. Cas. 56, 60 (H.L. 1907); John Harper & Co. v.
Wright & Butler Lamp Mfg. Co., [1896] 1 Ch. 142, 146 (C.A.).
109. See Leatheries, Ltd. v. Lycett Saddle & Motor Accessories Co.,
26 R. Pat. Cas. 166 (Oh. D. 1909). See also Application of Evered & Co.,
[1961] R. Pat. Cas. 105 (Pat. App. Trib. 1960).
110. See cases cited note 109 supra. But see Varley v. Keighley
Iron Works Soc'y, 14 R. Pat. Cas. 169, 171 (Q.B. 1896).
111. Le May v. Welch, 28 Ch. D. 24, 33-34 (C.A. 1884) (not any trif-
ling change can justify registering a design).
112. Like the American courts, the English courts may be facing the
problem of determining how substantial the difference must be to be
novel. It is very difficult to define the limits of "substantial" because of
the lack of recent cases concerning designs. See Note, 72 HARv. L. REV.
1520, 1535 n.96 (1958).
113. Kestos, Ltd. v. Kempat, Ltd., 53 R. Pat. Cas. 139, 153 (Ch. D.
1935); see John Harper & Co. v. Wright & Butler Lamp Mfg. Co.,
[1896] 1 Ch. 142 (C.A.).
114. See Stenor, Ltd. v. Whitesides, Ltd., [1947] 2 All E.R. 241,
243 (H.L.).
115. Id. at 243-44.
116. Dover, Ltd. v. Niirnberger Celluloidwaren Fabrik Gebrfilder
Wolff, [1910] 2 Ch. 25, 29-30 (C.A.). But see In the Matter of Morton's
Design, 17 R. Pat. Cas. 117 (Ch. D. 1899).
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the class of articles carrying them, 17 the "original" design can-
not be novel, since it is already carried on another article.
Thus, it would appear that this interpretation of "new or origi-
nal" cannot be accepted. The test must be a singular one; only
if the design is novel does it meet the registration requirements
of the act.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING A NEW TYPE OF
PROTECTION FOR DESIGNS
The English registration system does not involve the prob-
lem of trying to fit designs into the American dichotomy of
patent or copyright protection. It eliminates the tendency to
apply mechanical invention standards to aesthetic creations.
The English standard for registering a design appears to be the
novelty standard of patentability adopted by Laverne."8 If,
under the English system, a design is novel through the eye of
an average observer, as compared to the prior art, it can be
protected. However, Laverne enunciates a more concrete test for
the degree of difference required for novelty: A design is novel
if it is not obvious to the average observer. The British do not
consider whether the design is ornamental or original in the
sense used in the United States." 9 However, as stated previ-
ously, these two requirements are rarely referred to in consider-
ing a design patent application.
As indicated by the analysis of the Laverne case, this is
probably the most desirable approach to defining a requirement
for protection of a design. Design must be in a constant state of
flux to be of value.12 0 Since the cultural welfare of our society
is advanced by keeping design in constant change, the goal of the
Constitution in providing a framework for protecting designs is
117. Stenor, Ltd. v. Whitesides, Ltd., [1947] 2 All E.R. 241 (H.L.)
(by implication). Since Stenor holds that a design is not anticipated
merely by designs on a like class of articles, it implies that registered
designs on all classes of articles constitute the prior art. Hence, it is
impossible to have a novel design by applying an old design to a new
article. The 1949 act also supports this conclusion by stating that a
design cannot be registered if it is the same as a design previously reg-
istered in respect to any article, or only differs immaterially. The
Registered Designs Act, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
118. This is also purported to be the sole standard presently being
applied by the United States Patent Office. REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 100, at 12.
119. The British act refers to a "new or original" design, but as
indicated previously, "original" probably adds nothing to the wording of
the act. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
120. See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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also advanced.'2 1 By making the requirements for protecting
designs less stringent through the use of novelty as the sole
criterion, more designs will receive protection. The necessary
consequences will be to require subsequent designers to make
some novel change before their designs will be protected and
noninfringing, and therefore to promote constant change in de-
sign.
Because the new standard will make design protection much
easier to obtain, the grant of an exclusive monopoly should be
for a shorter period of time than the present patent grant.
22
By adopting a shorter time period, a designer will receive a
monopoly for a period of time which is consistent with his con-
tribution to the art.
To achieve these ends, an act should be formulated which
would implement the desirable features of both the present de-
sign protection law and the English law. Although there have
been numerous attempts to legislate in this area,' 2s most were
aimed at halting design piracy among dress creators. 24 The
majority of these unsuccessful attempts would have made origi-
nality of design the critical test, so that infringement would be
possible only if the design were copied. 25 Although this type of
protection might alleviate some of the problems in the garment
industry, it would not obviate the necessity of proposing a new
type of protection to benefit all designers and to promote the
whole of design art.126 The following legislative proposal is not
intended to be comprehensive, but it should help to provide a
framework for mitigating the most serious problems in this area.
121. See Pfaff, supra note 90.
122. Cf. Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 517, 525-26 (1955). It is believed
that an appropriate period of time would be three years.
123. Solberg, The Present Copyright Situation, 40 YALE L.J. 184,
187-89 (1930), contains a good summary of the attempts at legislation
prior to 1930. One of the more significant attempts was the 1930 Vestal
Bill, H.R. 10351, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which proposed to eliminate
design patents and provide copyright protection. Thus the requirement
of "patentable novelty" would be replaced by the more liberal require-
ment of originality. See Legislation, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 477, 485 (1931).
124. See generally GOTSHAL, THE PniATEs WiLL GET You 47-59
(1945); Note, 49 YALE L.J. 1290 (1940). See also Latman, The Status
and Impact of Design Piracy, 2 PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. 286 (1958).
125. An excellent example is a bill introduced on January 18, 1967
by Congressman Ford. H.R. 2886, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The
bill would provide protection for any original ornamental design. Id.
§ 1(a). Protection would operate much the same as would a copy-
right. See id. § 4. However, the bill was not to affect the current
copyright and design patent statutes. Id. §§ 27, 28.
126. See note 125 supra.
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IV. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REGISTRATION
OF DESIGNS
SECTION 1. REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS
Upon application of anyone claiming to be the proprietor of
any new design upon an article of manufacture, the Commis-
sioner of Patents may register such design subject to the provi-
sions of this act.
Comment: This section is intended to replace the present Design
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. section 171, and to make novelty the sole
prerequisite for registering a design.
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS
(a) A design is the impression displayed by an article of
manufacture.
(b) An article of manufacture is an artificially created tan-
gible object which is capable of being reproduced by an in-
dustrial process.
(c) The proprietor is the creator or originator of the de-
sign.
Comment: Subsections (a) and (b) are basically a codification
of present law. Subsection (c) merely clarifies the mandate of
35 U.S.C. section 102(f) which requires the inventor to be the
applicant.
SECTION 3. STANDARD FOR REGISTRATION
The test of whether a design is new under this act is nov-
elty. A design shall be deemed novel if the differences between
the design sought to be registered and the prior art are such
that the design as a whole would not have been obvious
through the eye of the average observer at the time the design
was created. The prior art shall be limited to designs previ-
ously registered or having priority under this act, or designs
which are patented under the repealed Design Patent Acts.
Comment: This section is intended to implement the test of
novelty enunciated in Laverne. It would abrogate any reliance
on one skilled in the art-the mandate of 35 U.S.C. section 103.
The prior art would be limited to protected designs, following
the British rule and the Laverne dictum.
SECTION 4. EFFEcT OF REGISTERING A DESIGN
The registration of a design under this act shall give to the
proprietor the exclusive right to make or import for sale or for
use for the purposes of any trade or business, or to sell, hire or
offer for sale or hire, any article in respect of which the design
is registered. This includes the exclusive right to apply said
registered design to any article of manufacture.
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Comment: This section is virtually identical to section 7 of the
British Design Registration Act. It is only intended to codify
the present state of the law concerning the protection a design
patent gives its owner.
SECTION 5. RIGHr OF PRORITY
The right of priority provided by 35 U.S.C. section 119 and
the time specified in 35 U.S.C. section 102(d) shall be six
months, and both of these sections shall apply in full to the
registration of designs.
Comment: This section is virtually identical to the present 35
U.S.C. section 172.
SECTION 6. TERm OF REGIsTRATIoN
Registration of Designs may be granted for the term of
three years.
Comment: This section replaces 35 U.S.C. section 173.
SECTION 7. TRAmsIToNAL EFFECT
All patents for designs granted and still effective under the
Design Patent Acts shall be deemed duly registered as of the
date this Act becomes effective. All previous design patents still
in force shall terminate at their expiration date or three years
after the effective date of this enactment, whichever occurs
first. All applications which have been submitted for Design
Patents shall, upon the effective date of this enactment, be
deemed to be applications for registration of designs and shall
be governed by the provisions of this act.
The provisions of the title relating to patents for inventions
shall apply to the registration of designs, except as otherwise
provided in this act.
Comment: It is the purpose of this section to provide for the
transition from patent to registration protection. Anyone hold-
ing a presently valid design patent would be deemed to have a
registered design without the necessity of reapplication or filing
for a registration certificate to replace his patent certificate.
The final paragraph is intended to allow the holder of a regis-
tered design to take advantage of all the patent act provisions
(infringement remedies, etc.) not inconsistent with this act.
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